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Abstract
A five-year, 0-1, mixed integer programming model was developed to analyze the effects
of 1990 Farm Bill legislation on the crop-mix decisions made on cotton farms. Results showed
that, when compared to the 1985 Farm Bill, the 1990 Farm Bill can result in higher whole-farm
income despite new “triple base” provisions limiting payment acres. The increase in income results
from elimination of limited cross-compliance provisions and the change to a three-year base
calculation. The model was also used to assess the likely impact of possible changes in the current
legislation.
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In the late 1980s, deficiency payments for
farm program crops reached unprecedentediy high
levels. In 1987, for example, deficiency payment
outlays reached $16.7 billion, up from $1.3 billion
in 1980. Deficiency payment expenditures were
expected to remain at very high levels throughout
the 1990’s, unless significant changes were made in
farm legislation, Concerns about high outlays led to
new provisions in the 1990 Farm Bill designed to
reduce farm program costs by limiting payment
acreage,l In exchange, new flexibility provisions
allow farmers to respond, at least in part, to market
signals.
For Midwestern corn-soybean farmers, new
1990 Farm Bill provisions unequivocally lead to
lower income because the loss in income through
reduction of the portion of base eligible for
government payments is only minimally offset by
increased income generated by the flexibility
provisions (Duffy and Taylor). For cotton,
however, the situation may be quite different. Two
other provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill, the change
from a five-year to a three-year period for
calculating cotton base (but not grain bases) and the
elimination of limited cross-compliance, may
significantly increase income on some cotton farms.
Previous research has shown that, under previous
Farm Bills, profit-maximizing farmers with low to
moderate levels of initial cotton base often had
incentives to expand cotton base by not participating
in the program for one or two years and planting
cotton extensively (Perry et al.; Mires et al.). This
strategy would result in substantially more base in
future years, given a three-year rather than five-year
base calculation period. In addition, elimination of
limited cross-compliance may boost income by
allowing farmers to plant double-cropped wheat and
soybeans on all residual acres, regardless of the
level of wheat base. Because soybeans do not have
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base acreage provisions, limited cross-compliance
had no effect on corn-soybean farmers; hence, its
removal would not provide a means for increasing
income.
The objective of this study is twofold.
First, the model presented by Perry et al. for
incorporating 1985 Farm Bill provisions into farm-
level decision models is updated for the new
program provisions. While the 1990 Farm Bill
retains some similarity to the 1985 program, the
new provisions are sufficiently extensive to warrant
development of a new model. Second, our
application will focus on income, crop-mix, and
program payments on Southeastern cotton farms,
Because of the variety of new provisions in the
1990 Farm Bill, it is impossible to assess the net
effect of the new Farm Bill on these farms, without
empirical analysis. Further, given continued interest
in reducing costs of the farm programs, some
possible alternatives for the future will be assessed:
an increase in normal flex acreage requirements,
and a change from a three-year to a five-year period
for calculating base.
Results should be of interest to policy
makers in several ways. First, because of the
shortened base calculation period, it is possible that
some cotton farmers may receive higher total
government program payments over the full five-
year period, despite reductions in program acreage
eligible for deficiency payments. Fiscal gains
anticipated by the federal government would thus be
reduced. Also, because of the elimination of limited
cross-compliance under the 1990 Farm Bill, cotton
farmers may be able to increase total farm income
even if government payments decline, a situation
beneficial to both the government and the farmer.
Finally, analysis of hypothetical future policy
provisions should provide an indication to policy
makers of the changes in farm management
strategies that such changes could provoke,
Background on the 1990 Farm Bill
In overall structure, the 1990 Farm Bill is
similar to the 1985 Bill. Acreage bases and
deficiency payments were key provisions of the
1985 Farm Bill and are retained with modifications
in the 1990 Farm Bill. In the 1985 Farm Bill,
acreage bases for cotton and grains were determined
as the lesser of a two-year or five-year moving
average of acreage planted or considered planted in
the program commodity. Under the 1990 Farm Bill,
base acreage in cotton is calculated as a three-year
moving average. (A strict five-year moving average
is now used for grains.)
Cotton farmers participating in the farm
program must limit cotton plantings to a portion of
cotton base. In exchange, they receive a direct
payment, the deficiency payment, on a portion of
base,2 For each farm program crop, the payment,
M, is calculated as:
(1) M = [TP - Max(MPJJ?)]*PY*AE
where TP is the legislated target price ($.729/lb. for
cotton), MP is the market price, LR is the CCC loan
rate, PY is “program yield,” and AE are acres
eligible to receive payment, Program yield is based
either on farm-level historic yields through 1986 or
on average county yields. Thus, program yield may
or may not reflect the current situation on a
particular farm.
Eligible acres are a portion of the base.
First, a specified percentage of the base, set by the
Secretary of Agriculture, must be idled if an acreage
reduction program (ARP) is in effect for that year.
ARP provisions, included in the 1985 Farm Bill,
continue in the 1990 Farm Bill. In addition, new
“triple base” provisions further limit payment
acreage. Under the 1990 Farm Bill, 15 percent of
a farmer’s base acreage in a commodity is
designated as “Normal Flex Acres” (NFA). On
these acres, the farmer may plant the particular
commodity for that base or a substitute crop, but
will receive no deficiency payment. Also, an
additional 10 percent of acres are designated as
“Optional Flex Acres” (OFA). The farmer may
plant these acres in the program crop and receive a
deficiency payment, or plant them in an alternative
crop and forfeit the deficiency payment. ARP,
NFA, and OFA are “considered planted’ in the
commodity for the purpose of calculating future
base acreage.
Another difference in the two Farm Bills is
the elimination of limited cross-compliance. Under
the 1985 Farm Bill, with its limited cross-
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farm program in one crop could not exceed the
base in other program crops even if these crops
were not enrolled in the farm program. Although
limited cross-compliance was eliminated in the 1990
Farm Bill, farmers cannot “build base” in one
program crop while participating in the farm
program in another, The overall effect of the 1990
Farm Bill legislation, therefore, is to provide more
flexibility to farmers in exchange for a reduction in
direct payments.
For cotton farmers in particular, these
flexibility provisions may be important income
boosters. In the Southeast, with its long growing
season, double cropping of soybeans and wheat is
an economically attractive alternative to full-season
soybeans. Under the 1985 Farm Bill, a farmer who
participated in the cotton program could not plant
wheat beyond the wheat base, even if farm program
participation was not chosen for wheat. Thus, as
shown by Mires et al., in many cases limited cross-
compliance could reduce whole-farm profits
significantly for Southeastern cotton farms.
Methods
As discussed by Perry et al., the discrete
choice involved in farm program participation
decisions is best handled by the use of mixed
integer programming. Incorporation of farm
program provisions for the 1985 Farm Bill into a
model of this type is described in detail in Perry et
al. For the 1990 Farm Bill provisions, a
substantially different model is required. Table 1 is
a section (from year 3) of a five-year mixed integer
programming model of a Southeastern cotton farm
under the 1990 Farm Bill, Cotton, soybeans, and
wheat are the major crop enterprises.
Under the 1990 Farm Bill, as under the
1985 Farm Bill, a farmer must decide between
program participation and nonparticipation.
Participation is nondivisible since one cannot
partially participate in government price support
programs; therefore, a pair of O-1 integer variables
was used to force the exclusivity of each such
decision. The Y-3 and X-3 columns are,
respectively, the participation and nonparticipation
activities for cotton in year 3, and the PROG-3 row
is constrained to equal 1, ensuring either
participation or nonparticipation in government
programs for cotton in that year. The PAL-3 row
keeps program cotton from entering the solution in
that year unless the participation activity is chosen.
If participation is chosen, the large negative transfer
causes the PAL-3 row to become nonconstraining,
and other rows, notably those involving the base,
will restrict the program cotton activity. Similarly,
the FAL-3 row prevents nonprogram cotton from
entering the solution unless the nonparticipation
activity is selected.
If program cotton is selected in year 3, the
PLIM-3, ARP-3, NFAT-3, and OFAT-3 rows
transfer program cotton acreage to different
activities to account for the acreage reduction
program and flex acreages. The acreage transferred
to the PAC-3 activity is eligible for deficiency
payment, while ARP and normal flex acres (NFA-3)
are not. Whether optional flex acres (OFA-3)
receive a deficiency payment depends on further
decisions, as discussed below. Together regular
planted acres of cotton (PAC-3), normal flex acres
from cotton (NFA-3), optional flex acres from
cotton (OFA-3), and the acreage reduction
requirement (ACP-3) form the acres “considered
planted” (AP-3) in cotton for the purpose of future
base calculations.
The normal flex acres from program cotton
may be used to plant additional nonpayment cotton
(XFC-3) or may be “flexed” to nonprogram wheat-
soybeans double cropped (XS-3) or full-season
soybeans (not shown). The NFLM-3 row ensures
normal flex acre plantings do not exceed the amount
of flex acres available, either from program cotton
or program wheat (not shown). Optional flex acres
from program cotton can be kept in the cotton
program by planting “extra program cotton”
(XLAC-3). Optional flex acres used in this manner
are eligible to receive a deficiency payment. The
optional flex acres from cotton may also be used to
plant nonprogram wheat-soybeans double cropped
(XS2-3), or full-season soybeans.
Cotton base is calculated as a three-year
moving average of those acres planted and
“considered planted.” Current Farm Bill provisions
do not allow base in one program crop to be
increased if there is participation in the program for
another crop, but base can be increased by choosing
nonparticipation in all program crops. This
provision represents the most significant break with
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Limits cotton production to either program or nonprogram, not both.
Nonbinding constraint if program cot~on selected through Prog-3.
Otherwise, sets program cotton to O.
Nonbinding constraint if nonprogram cotton selected through Prog-3.
Otherwise sets nonprogram cotton to O.
Limits total program acreage to base.
Transfers 65 percent of program cotton to planting activity,
excluding ARP and all triple base.
Transfers 15 percent of program cotton to normal flex acres.
Transfers 10 percent of program cotton to optional flex acres.
Transfers 5 percent of program cotton to ARP.
Calculates base in year 4.
Transfers production (yield) to a marketing activity (SCT).
Transfers proven yield to a program production activity (PCT).
Limits acres to the base if program wheat is selecred, nonbinding
otherwise.
Totals actual cotton acres, program or nonprogram.
Works with LIMCB-3 to restrict the CTBS-3 activity to lesser
of CTiNR-3 or CTCR-3, to prevent base expansion in cotton if
program wheat is planted.
Calculates deficiency payment on program cotton.
Distributes normal flex acres to possible activities.
Distributes optional flex acres to possible activities.
Several activities are introduced into the mixed
integer programming model to ensure compliance
with this provision. First, the CTNR-3 activity is
the total cotton in each year including all cotton
acres planted and “considered planted,” as calculated
in the ANCL-3 row. If program wheat is planted,
the CTCR-3 activity is restricted to the current
cotton base. If nonprogram wheat is selected,
however, the CTCR-3 becomes a large positive
number through use of the wheat integer activity
(WX-3), Working together, the LIMCA-3 and the
LIMCB-3 rows restrict the CTBS-3 activity to the
lesser of CTNR-3 or CTCR-3. A transfer row
(TBASEC-3) then transfers a third of the CTBS-3
activity into the base activity (BASE-4) for future
years.
When participation in the cotton program
is selected, the TPCOT-3 row transfers the amount
of program cotton produced (in pounds of lint per
acre) into the PCT-3 activity where a deficiency
payment can be calculated. The actual amount of
deficiency payment to be received is calculated in
the DEFPAY-3 row. The TFCOT-3 row transfers
all cotton produced, whether in the program or out,
to a marketing activity (SCT-3).
For wheat program activities, a set of
constraints similar to those shown in table 1 are
used. Given space limitations, the full model is not
presented here, but a copy of the computer code
used in this model is available from the authors on
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Integer activity for program participation.
Integer activity for no program participation.
Total program cotton acres.
Nonprogram cotton
Normal flex acres planted to cotton (no deficiency payment).
Optional flex acres planted to cotton (deficiency payment).
Normal flex acres planted to wheat-soybeans double cropped.
Optional flex acres planted to wheat-soybeans double cropped.
Cotton program plantings, excluding any flex acres.
Total optional flex acres.
Total normal flex acres.
Cotton considered planted for base calculation if wheat program selected.
Cotton considered planted for base calculation if wheat program not
selected.
Cotton acreage from year 1 used in future base calculation.
Cotton acreage from year 2 used in future base calculation.
Cotton acreage from year 3 used in future base calculation.
Cotton base in year 3.
Deficiency payment activity.
Production of cotton eligible for deficiency payment.
Acreage Reduction Program (ARP) acreage.
Cotton base in year 4.
Wheat program integer for year 3.
Total cotton available for sale.
and the 0/92 program, available for wheat, were not
included in this analysis. Under prevailing market
prices and yields, these options are not attractive to
a producer unless labor or capital is constrained. If
gross returns were less than variable costs or labor
severely limited, this option would become
attractive, Modeling these options can be handled
either through additional integer activities in the
PROG row (Perry et al.), or through additional
transfer rows (Gillespie et al.), CRP was also not
included here, but can be handled easily, as shown
by Gillespie et al.
Mechanisms for payment limitations are
also included in the model, but are not enforced in
this study. Given the size of the farm, and its initial
base, limits would not be exceeded in most cases.
Additionally, legal organization is often used to
avoid these limits (see Mires et al.; Perry et al,).
The Representative Farms
For this study, five-year mixed integer
programming models were developed to represent
two cotton farms, one reflecting conditions inJ. Agr. and Applied Econ., December, 1993
Southwestern Alabama (farm 1), the other
representing conditions in Northern Alabama and/or
Western Tennessee (farm 2). In both areas of the
Southeast, cotton, soybeans, and wheat are
important field crops, but cotton production differs
significantly in terms of yields and costs.
Crop yields and cost of production
estimates for both farms were based on 1992
budgets from the Alabama Cooperative Extension
Service (ACES). Cotton yield (based on solid
planting) was 697 pounds of lint per acre on farm
1 and 667 pounds of lint per acre on farm 2. Based
on the ACES budgets, variable cotton production
costs, excluding labor, were assumed to be $335.11
on farm 1 and $293.61 per acre on farm 2.
Differences in cotton yield and costs of production
in the two areas reflect different insect control
problems. In addition, South Alabama is part of the
Boll Weevil Eradication zone, while North Alabama
and Tennessee are not. Effects of the Boll Weevil
Eradication program are captured in the budget for
South Alabama cotton.
Wheat yield was assumed to be 35 bu.lacre
on both farms, with per acre variable costs of
production of $78.36. Full-season soybeans were
assumed to have a yield of 25 bu./acre on both
farms, with variable production costs of $82.54/acre.
Soybeans double cropped with wheat were assumed
to have a yield of 23/bu, acre on both farms, with
variable production costs of $80.47. According to
ACES specialists, wheat and soybean production,
unlike cotton, are roughly similar in both areas.3
The basic structure of farm 2 (North
Alabama/West Tennessee) was patterned after a
similar farm used in the Mires et al. study to
represent commercial-sized farms in the area. The
farm has 948 acres of tillable cropland and $53,240
of annual fixed costs, including depreciation and
interest. To make results comparable across farms,
the South Alabama farm was assumed to have the
same acreage and fixed costs. Fixed costs do not
enter into the crop-mix or program participation
choices in the model, but will affect total profits.
Clearly, the level of initial base on the farm
will effect both crop-mix and income. In the Mires
et al. study, beginning bases were set at 492 acres
for cotton and 38 acres for wheat, based on
Alabama Farm Analysis Association data. These
125
levels were accordingly selected as starting points
for initial base levels in this study.
Labor costs are calculated separately in the
model, at a rate of $5.00 per hour, with labor hired
as needed. Each farm was assumed to be endowed
with unpaid operator and family labor equivalent to
2 full-time workers. Labor requirements were
calculated for six production periods, based on
information collected by the Alabama Cooperative
Extension Service and the Alabama Agricultural
Experiment Station.
Expected market prices for the
commodities were obtained from Alabama
Cooperative Extension Service budgets: $0.62 per
pound of lint for cotton, $3.15 per bushel for wheat,
and $5.75 per bushel for soybeans. Market prices
were held constant across all five years of the
planning horizon.
The announced target price for upland
cotton was $0.729 per pound of lint, and the target
price for wheat was $4.00. Since soybeans do not
have a deficiency payment program, there is no
target price for soybeans. For this study, acreage
reduction requirements (ARP) were fixed at 10
percent for upland cotton and 15 percent for wheat.4
For this study, the assumed objective of
producers is maximization of the multi-year
discounted stream of incomes Returns are
discounted using a 7 percent discount factor, chosen
to approximate the opportunity cost of capital.
Choice of discount rate (within reasonable limits)
does not greatly affect model results, In the Mires
et al. study, tax rates did not affect the optimal
decision; accordingly, tax functions are not included
in the model. No rotational restrictions are
incorporated into the model because most cotton
farmers in the study area do not use rotations
extensively (see Mires et al.).
A five-year planning horizon was chosen
for this study because it represents a time period
over which the farmer can be reasonably certain the
farm program (five years in length) will continue.
Beyond five years, uncertainty about the future
direction of farm programs (and market trends) can
become very high (see Perry). If desired, the
objective function of this type of model can be
modified to account for the value of base at the end126 Duffy, Cain, and Young: Incorporating the 1990 Farm Bill into Farm-Level Decision Models
of the five-year planning horizon (see Perry et al,),
These ending values, in some cases, would provide
an increased motivation for farmers to expand base
in the early years.
Results
The mixed integer programming models
were first used to compare the optimal crop-mix and
farm-program participation decisions made under
conditions outlined in both the 1985 Farm Bill and
the 1990 Farm Bill. In addition, the amount of
direct government program payments collected was
calculated. In each case, all price, yield, and cost
assumptions remained constant for the entire
planning horizon of the model. The models were
next used to analyze the effects of possible changes
in current policy on farm income, crop-mix, and
payments,
The 1985 versus the 1990 Farm Bills
Results for the comparison between the
1985 and 1990 Farm Bills are presented in tables 2
and 3, For both farms, the base-building “strategy”
remains unchanged, regardless of the legislation
assumed to be in effect. For farm 1, maximum
profits are obtained by dropping out of the program
for one year, planting the entire farm in cotton, and
then remaining within program limits for the
remainder of the time horizon. For farm 2, which
has higher per acre net returns for cotton outside the
program, two years of base building are optimal.
Under the 1990 Farm Bill, base is calculated using
a three-year moving average; thus, cotton base in
the later years is considerably higher than under the
1985 Farm Bill. In these analyses, all flex acres are
planted in cotton, rather than in soybeans or wheat
and soybeans double cropped, because nonprogram
cotton is somewhat more profitable on a per acre
basis than the alternatives.
The lack of change in the optimal base-
building strategy was somewhat surprising, given
the changes in farm legislation, Since the passage
of the 1990 Farm Bill, cotton acreage has been
increasing in some areas in the Southeast, Our
analysis shows that the increase in acreage was
probably not spurred by the change in farm
programs per se, but rather was the result of
changes in relative yields and market prices
combined with relatively favorable base expansion
provisions in the new legislation. In this analysis,
prices and yields were held constant at current
(1992-93) levels, regardless of the Farm Bill
considered. With lower yields and/or cotton prices,
sensitivity analysis indicates that base acreage is
less likely to be expanded. Hence, nonprogram
changes over the last five years, such as increased
yields from the Boll Weevil Eradication program,
have most likely contributed significantly to the
increasing cotton acreage in the Southeast (Cain).
The shorter base calculation period under the 1990
Farm Bill results in greater cotton acreage after the
base-building period ends, contributing to the
general trend.
For both farms, the discounted stream of
before-tax net farm income increases under the 1990
Farm Bill. For farm 1, the objective function rises
from $183,453 to $210,485. The increase in income
occurs despite a decline in deficiency payments,
from $164,751 over five years under the provisions
of the 1985 Farm Bill to $159,591 under the
provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill. Much of the
increased income can be attributed to the
elimination of the cross-compliance provision,
Budgeting shows that wheat-soybeans double
cropped is more profitable than full-season soybeans
on both farms. Under the limited cross-compliance
provision of the 1985 Farm Bill, however, acreage
of wheat is severely limited, even when program
participation is not elected for wheat.b For farmers
with a large initial endowment of wheat base, the
effects of limited cross-compliance were minimal;
such farmers would not benefit as strongly from the
switch to the 1990 Farm Bill provisions.
For farm 2, the objective function increases
from $249,272 under the 1985 provisions to
$276,119 under the 1990 provisions. Deficiency
payments increased from $135,964 over five years
under the 1985 Farm Bill provisions to $140,323
over five years under the 1990 Farm Bill provisions.
Although triple base provisions of the 1990 Farm
Bill reduce the percentage of base eligible for
payment, the shorter period for base calculation
results in enough additional base to more than offset
the loss in deficiency payments due to
implementation of triple base. This result was notJ, Agr. and Applied Econ., December, 1993 127
Table 2. Crop-Mix and Returns for Farm 1, 492-Acre Beginning Base
1985 Farm Bill
Obiect ive Function: S183.453
Cotton Wheat-Soybeans Soybeans Govt. Payments
Year J 948 0 0 0
Year 2 583’
~gb 346 40,725
Year 3 , 601= , Ob 338 41,548
Year 4 592a
,db 341 41,136
Year 5 597’ ,~b 339 41,342
1990 Farm Bill
Obiect ive Function: $210.485
Cotton Wheat-Soybeans Soybeans Govt. Payments
Year 1 948 0 0 0
Year 2 644’ 304 0 36,693
Year 3 695’ 253 0 39,578
Year 4 762’ 186 0 43,425
Year 5 700= 248 0 39,895
‘ Total acres enrolled in farm program for cotton, including ARP.
b Total acres enrolled in farm program for wheat, including ARp.
anticipated a priori, and underscores the importance
of analyzing farm policy changes in a whole-farm
framework where policy interactions are revealed,
Perry found that introducing risk aversion
into his models, via quadratic programming
techniques, resulted in outcomes in which farmers
would remain within program bases. To assess the
level of risk associated with a profit-maximizing
base expanding strategy, we simulated the optimal
crop-mix decisions from our mixed integer
programming models for the 1990 Farm Bill and
compared results with those obtained from
simulations of a five-year strategy of planting cotton
within program limits every year with residual
acreage in nonprogram wheat and soybeans double
cropped. FLIPSIM V (Richardson and Nixon) was
used to simulate the five-year optimal farm plans
over 100 iterations with market prices and yields
drawn from a distribution based on ten years of
actual production data obtained from the Alabama
Farm Analysis Association. Results indicate that,
for a farmer with low leverage, base-expansion
carries no additional risk of whole-farm failure,
although income variance was indeed higher in
nonprogram years, For farmers with high debt
levels, base-expansion, with its subsequent higher
income, leads to a higher probability of remaining
solvent for five years. Although income variance
increases in the early years, the down-side risk is
more than offset by higher average earnings in the
later years. Thus, when concluding that risk-averse128 D14j7jI, Cain, and Yot4ng: Incorporating the 1990 Farm Bill info Farm-Level Decision Models
Table 3. Crop-Mix and Returns for Farm 2, 492-Acre Beginning Base
1985 Farm Bill
~. tive Function: S249.272
Cotton Wheat-Soybeans Soybeans Govt. Payments
Year 1 948 0 0 0
Year 2 948 0 0 0
Year 3 674’ 0 274 44,128
Year 4 711= o 237 46,515
Year 5 693’ 0 255 45,321
1990 Farm Bill
Ob iective Function: S276.119
Cotton Wheat-Soybeans Soybeans Govt. Payments
Year 1 948 0 0 0
Year 2 948 0 0 0
Year 3 796a 152 0 43,400
Year 4 897’ 51 0 48,923
Year 5 880’ 68 0 48,000
‘ Total acres enrolled in farm program for cotton, including ARP.
b Total acres enrolled in farm program for wheat, including ARP.
farmers are more likely to remain in the farm
program, one must carefully assess how risk is
perceived by farmers: whether the problem is
variance of annual returns, or the possibility of farm
failure. If the latter, base-building strategies maybe
less risky than participating in the program each
year.7
Results in tables 2 and 3 pertain to the case
where a farmer has approximately half the total
tillable acreage in cotton base, Analternative set of
models was also analyzed, using a beginning base
of711 acres. These results arereported intables4
and5. Ascanbe seen from the results, when initial
base is high, farmers are less likely to engage in a
base-expanding strategy. Under the 1985Farm Bill,
both farms remain inside the cotton base in all
years, Under the 1990 Farm Bill, when beginning
base is 711 acres, farm 1 remains inside program
limits in every year. Deficiency payments, in this
case, slightly exceed the $50,000 legislated limit.
Enforcing the payment limitation does not greatly
affect results. On farm 2, under the 1990 Farm
Bill, cotton is planted on the full acreage in the first
year of the planning horizon, a different
management strategy than employed for the 1985
Farm Bill.
For both farms, when initial base is 711
acres, the switch from the 1985 Farm Bill
provisions to the 1990 Farm Bill provisions results
in lower total income as well as lower deficiency
payments, In our study, 1985 and 1990 Farm Bill
provisions were compared under the assumption thatJ. Agr, and Applied Eccm., December, 1993 129
Table 4. Crop-Mix and Returns for Farm 1, 71l-Acre Beginning Base
1985 Farm Bill
Ob iective Function: S256.338
Cotton Whear-Soybeans Sovbeans Govt. Payments
Year 1 711= 38b 199 50,311
Year 2 111~ ~gb 199 50,31 i
Year 3 711a 38b 199 50,311
Year 4 7114 Sgb 199 50,311
Year 5 711’ 38b 199 50,311
1990 Farm Bill
Ob iective Functioru $244.615
Cotton Wheat-Soybeans Soybeans Govt. Payments
Year 1 711a 237 0 40,513
Year 2 711a 237 0 40,513
Year 3 711a 237 0 40,513
Year 4 711a 237 0 40,513
Year 5 711’ 237 0 40.513
a Total acres enrolled in farm program for cotton, including ARP.
b Total acres enrolled in farm program for wheat, including ARP.
ARP requirements remain the same. In actuality,
though, ARP requirements change over time
depending on the stocks-to-use ratio. Thus, under
the 1985 Farm Bill, ARP levels as high as 25
percent were implemented (Mires et al.), while ARP
levels under the 1990 Farm Bill have been in the 5
to 10 percent range, By simple budgeting, it can be
shown that a low ARP level with triple base
provisions in effect compares favorably with a high
ARP level and no triple base, even with base held
constant. Had triple base not been introduced, it is
possible that higher ARP levels might have been an
alternative technique used to reduce expenditures on
the farm program. Thus it would be a mistake to
conclude emphatically that the 1990 Farm Bill hurts
farmers with high initial cotton bases, without
considering the probable ARP levels that would
have been imposed had the farm program provisions
not been changed,
Sensitivity analyses on market prices, target
prices, yields, and ARP levels were also performed.
In general it was found that for the 1990 Farm Bill
base-expansion of cotton is most likely to occur
when per acre returns from nonprogram cotton are
high relative to those obtained from wheat-soybeans
doubled cropped (the most economically attractive
alternative), target prices are at least moderately
high, and ARP levels are not unduly high. With
very high target prices, base expansion will be
undertaken even when nonprogram cotton offers
lower per acre returns than wheat-soybeans double130 DufY, Cuin, and Young: Incorporating the 1990 Farm Bill into Farm-Level Decision Models
Table 5. Crop-Mix and Returns for Farm 2, 711 -Acre Beginning Base
1985 Farm Bill
Obiect ive Function: $307.839
Cotton Wheat-Soybeans Soybeans Govt. Paymen~
Year 1 711a 38b 199 48,219
Year 2 711. 38b 199 48,219
Year 3 711’ 38b 199 48,219
Year 4 711a 38b 199 48,219
Year 5 711= 38b 199 48,219
1990 Farm Bill
Ob iective Function: $298.719
Cotton Wheat-Soybeans Soybeans Govt. Payments
Year 1 948 0 0 0
Year 2 790’ 158 0 43,074
Year 3 816a 132 0 44,509
Year 4 851’ 97 0 46,420
Year 5 819a 129 0 44.663
a Total acres enrolled in farm program for cotton, including ARP.
b Total acres enrol]ed in farm program for wheat, inchsdin8 ARp.
cropped. With moderate target prices and per acre
returns from nonprogram cotton below those of
wheat-soybeans double cropped, the profit-
maximizing strategy involves staying within the
program base and planting normaI flex acres in
wheat-soybeans double cropped.
Policy Options for the Future
Because of continued concern over the
national debt, it is possible that efforts will be
made, with the next Farm Bill, to reduce direct
payments. One alternative, increasing normal flex
acreage, has already been discussed by policy
makers.8 To analyze the effects of this possibility y,
the farm models were modified so that NFA was 25
percent of base, rather than the current 15 percent,
with all other provisions of the 1990 Farm Bill
remaining constant.
Even with higher NFA, “base building”
was still the optimal strategy for farms with a 492-
acre beginning base. For both farms, when 492
acres of beginning base are assumed, the optimal
farm plan remained unchanged as NFA increased.
Government payments and farm income fell by
exactly the amount of the lost deficiency payments.
For farm 1, five-year discounted returns fell from
$210,485 with 15 percent NFA to $193,697 with 25
percent NFA. For farm 2, five-year discounted
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With a 711-acre beginning base and 15
percent NFA, the optimal farm plan for farm 1
involved participating in the cotton program every
year. This strategy remained unchanged as NFA
increased to 25 percent. For farm 2 with a 711-acre
beginning base, the strategy of staying out of the
program for a year to build base also remained
unchanged as NFA increased. In both cases, as for
the farms with less base, income and deficiency
payments were reduced in direct proportion to the
increase in NFA.
For the set of prices and yields used in this
analysis, NFA was always planted in cotton.
Accordingly, identical effects on income and
program payments could be achieved by direct
reduction of the target price. Because NFA allows
farmers some flexibility to respond to changing
market conditions for alternative crops, this option
would probably be preferred by farmers to a
reduction in target price. If wheat and soybean
prices increase, NFA provisions would allow
farmers to capture extra market returns without
reducing cotton base.
Another analysis, in which the base
calculation period was expanded to five years and
NFA set at the initial 15 percent, was also
performed. For the farms with a 492-acre
beginning base, this policy resulted in discounted-
five year returns almost identical to those achieved
with a three-year base and 25 percent flex acreage,
For farms with a 71l-acre beginning base, however,
an increase in the base-calculation period had
almost no effect on farm income or government
payments. An increase in NFA would therefore be
most likely to reduce government payments in the
aggregate as all farms would be “hit” more or less
proportionately,
Conclusions
Results of this study show that with prices,
yields, production costs, and acreage reduction
requirements held constant at prevailing levels,
Southeastern cotton farmers with low to moderate
initial cotton bases probably benefit from the change
from the 1985 to the 1990 Farm Bill. A shorter
calculation period for base acreage coupled with the
elimination of limited cross-compliance offer
opportunities for increased profits that more than
offset losses due to the new triple base provisions.
When initial base is high, the 1990 Farm Bill results
in lower income than would be realized under the
1985 Farm Bill, if other factors, particularly acreage
reduction requirements, are held constant.
Interestingly, the optimal strategy in terms of “base
building” remained fairly constant as the farm
program changed. Other factors, such as increased
yields induced by the Boll Weevil Eradication
program and market conditions (held constant at
current levels in this analysis), are therefore more
likely to have caused the expansion in cotton
acreage in the Southeast during recent years.
Simulation of the optimal farm plans shows
that risk-averse farmers, as well as profit-
maximizers, may prefer a base expanding strategy
if risk is defined in terms of possibility of farm
failure rather than variability in annual income. The
risk of low income in the “nonprogram” early years
of base expansion is more than offset by the benefit
of increased earnings later on, leading to equal or
greater likelihood of financial survival over a five-
year period, Thus, it cannot be said without further
research that base expansion is inherently risky.
Because farmers are able to adjust base
more rapidly under the 1990 Farm Bill, in some
instances total deficiency payments made to a
farmer over a five-year period might increase, in
spite of triple base. This result underscores the
importance of analyzing the effects of program
provisions on a whole-farm basis, rather than in
isolation. For cotton farms, the money-saving triple
base provisions, in some instances, can be partially
or completely offset by the shortened base
calculation period, a benefit not extended to cash
grain farms.132 Dujjfy, Cain, and Young: Incorporating the 1990 Farm Bill into Farm-Level Decision Models
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Endnotes
1. In this paper, the term “1985 Farm Bill” refers to agricultural policy legislation as amended and
enacted before the passage of the 1990 Farm Bill. The “1990 Farm Bill” refers to current laws on
agricultural policy as enacted in the Food, Agricultural, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, as
well as the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990. In referring to these two Acts as “Farm
Bills,” the authors follow conventional usage.
2, When a marketing loan is in effect, a second direct payment, the loan deficiency payment (or the
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Alternative levels of ARP were tested. Within broad limits, the ARP levels do not significantly
affect results when ARP levels are held constant across the two program regimes.
As noted by Mires et al., empirical evidence indicates that while the hypothesis of risk aversion
is valid for some producers, it is not valid for all (Lin et al; Knowles; Wilson). Additionally, risk
aversion can be handled in a number of ways. Target Motad (Tauer) has been used to attach a
penalty to year to year variance in income, In other work, risk aversion has been handled through
“safety first” constraints (Atwood et al.). Thus the choice of objective function, strict profit
maximization vs. a modification to account for risk, depends on the objectives of the study. In this
study, we wish to determine how changes in the farm program affect the producers’ ability to
generate income; hence profit maximization was used.
Although wheat-soybeans double cropped have significantly higher expected per acre profits than
full-season soybeans, some producers elect full-season soybeans because of other considerations.
Double cropping requires high managerial skills and a reliable machinery compliment. Variance
on soybean yields is also perceived to be higher under double cropping.
The risk analysis performed here pertains to one specific situation. Analysis of different types of
farms under alternative mean price and yield assumptions is needed before strong conclusions about
the risk inherent in base-building can be reached.
Policy options analyzed here by no means provide an exhaustive analysis of potential changes in
the farm legislation. A copy of the computer code for these models is available, on request, so that
interested people can perform additional analyses beyond the scope of this study.